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Abstract
This paper analyzes the U.S. congressional proposal to instruct the Federal Reserve
to, in the next ﬁve years, lower inﬂation to zero from its current rate of around 5
percent. The paper concludes that, when other policy options are considered, the
zero inﬂation policy is not advisable. Its beneﬁts would be very small—possibly
negative—while its costs would probably be signiﬁcant. Other, more direct policy
options could produce most of the same beneﬁts with fewer costs. Among these
alternative policies are deregulating interest rates on demand deposits, paying
interest on ﬁnancial institution reserves, lowering the federal tax rate on capital
income, and indexing the federal tax code to inﬂation.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Early in the last decade, the annual U.S. inﬂation rate
plunged from extremely high, double-digit levels to an ap-
parently more acceptable level, around 5 percent. That’s
where it’s hovered ever since, to the great relief of many.
Lately, though, some people have begun to see even 5
percent as quite high. Just last year, in fact, the U.S. Con-
gress began to consider legislation instructing the Federal
Reserve to lower the inﬂation rate to zero in the next ﬁve
years.
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Would eliminating inﬂation be a reasonable policy to
adopt? Some say, yes: Moving the inﬂation rate from 5
percent to zero would likely have some temporary costs,
as the rate of change in the general price level gradually
slowed and the economy adjusted; but in the long run, the
policy’s beneﬁts would outweigh its costs. Others say, no:
The move’s costs could easily outweigh its beneﬁts. This
conclusion comes primarily from a consideration of policy
options besides zero inﬂation that could produce most of
its beneﬁts with fewer costs.
I side with the naysayers. My review of the available
relevant economic theory and evidence demonstrates that
the case for a shift to the proposed policy of zero inﬂation
is, at best, weak.
An Economic Measure of Welfare
Before I explain that in detail, let me explain how econo-
mists measure the costs and beneﬁts of moving to zero in-
ﬂation—or any other policy option.
Ingeneral,ourgoalwhenanalyzingagovernmentalpol-
icy is to try to determine the policy’s overall effect on the
welfare of society as a whole. We think of society’s wel-
fare in quite a natural way—as the satisfaction, or happi-
ness, of its individual members. But how do you measure
the satisfaction of even one person, much less that of mil-
lions? Economists think of individual satisfaction as re-
sulting from time spent in leisure activities and from the
consumption of goods and services. Therefore, for us, a
natural measure of a person’s satisfaction is the income re-
quired to support whatever amounts of leisure and con-
sumption the person is enjoying. What we’re interested in
when analyzing a policy change is how it would change
this income measure of satisfaction. We try to judge that
effect for an individual, then magnify the measure and ex-
press the resulting likely change in total individual satis-
faction as a percentage of total income in the economy.
That is, we determine and measure the total welfare ef-
fects of a proposed governmental policy—its likely costs
and beneﬁts—and translate them into percentages of the
gross national product (GNP).
Policies that are meant to change inﬂation are rather
difficult to analyze. A proper analysis of such a policy
would start with a formal theoretical model that simultane-
ously captures all the ways changes in an economy’s mon-
ey supply—and thus its general price level—affect the
welfare of the economy’s participants. However, money
and inﬂation inﬂuence the welfare of people in many com-
plex ways, so economists haven’t developed that type of
comprehensivemodelyet.Allwe’vedonesofarisidentify
a few of its essential features. Changes in each of these
features due to policy-induced changes in inﬂation are
what we have studied and tried to measure and translate
into a percentage of GNP. These changes can be thought
of as the policy’s welfare costs and beneﬁts.
A Critical Cost/Beneﬁt Analysis
Studies of the welfare effects of the proposed zero inﬂa-
tionpolicysuggestthat,fromanarrowperspective,itsben-
eﬁts would outweigh its costs. But a broader view, one that
takes other policy options into account, concludes just the
opposite.
The Beneﬁts of Zero Inﬂation?. . .
The beneﬁts of a zero inﬂation policy have been identiﬁed
as coming from three separate sources (the features of the
hypothetical money model mentioned above): a reduction
in the costs of making transactions, a reduction in the
capital income tax, and a reduction in uncertainty. Studies
have estimated the sizes of most of these beneﬁts, and sup-
porters of zero inﬂation seem to consider their total fairly
large. I disagree. When the analysis expands to include
alternative policy options, the ﬁrst two of the three esti-
mated beneﬁts clearly are too high. The third seems to be
mistakenly classiﬁed as a beneﬁt; that classiﬁcation is not





An often-mentioned beneﬁt of eliminating inﬂation is a re-
duction in the efforts people would make to decrease the
amount of cash they hold available for spending. I think
this transaction cost beneﬁt would actually be very small.
The idea here is that inﬂation encourages the waste of
resources each time people convert interest-earning assets
into money, so eliminating inﬂation would save those re-
sources for productive uses. Resources are wasted with in-
ﬂation because it raises market interest rates, and people
naturally want to earn as much interest as they can. They
can’t earn much with some forms of money used in trans-
actions: currency and demand deposits.
2 So, with inﬂation
raising market interest rates, people try to decrease their
balances of currency and demand deposits and increase
their assets that earn market rates of interest. When people
want to spend, this involves some costly juggling—fre-
quent trips to the bank or the cash machine, for example,
to get cash or move funds between accounts. (These costs
are also known as shoe-leather costs.) Lowering inﬂation
to zero is expected to reduce these costs by lowering mar-
ket interest rates and so people’s incentive to juggle funds
between accounts.
Studies have come up with several quantitative esti-
mates of the welfare beneﬁt from reducing transaction
costs.Theseestimatesvaryinsizeacrossstudiesandacross
the deﬁnitions of money used to calculate the beneﬁt. One
study (Fischer 1981a) says that a ten percentage point re-
duction in inﬂation would produce a transaction cost bene-
ﬁt of about 0.30 percent of GNP if the monetary base (cur-
rency plus ﬁnancial institution reserves) is used in the cal-
culation. For the same inﬂation reduction, but using the
Fed’s slightly broader deﬁnition of money, M1 (currency
plus checkable deposits plus travelers checks), another
study (Lucas1981) putsthe transactioncost beneﬁthigher,
at about 0.45 percent of GNP. Yet another study (Cooley
andHansen1989)getslowerestimatesforthisinﬂationre-
duction: 0.08percent of GNPfor thebase and0.30 percent
of GNP for M1.Based on these studies, eliminating inﬂation as the pro-
posedpolicysuggestscouldreasonablybeexpectedtopro-
duce at least a small transaction cost beneﬁt. Inﬂation has
been roughly 5 percent lately, so lowering inﬂation to zero
would mean reducing it about ﬁve percentage points, half
the amount the studies assumed. If we halve the studies’
lowest and highest estimated beneﬁts, we get a reasonable
range for the proposed policy’s transaction cost beneﬁt:
from 0.04 percent to 0.22 percent of GNP.
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However,this beneﬁtwouldlikelybe evensmallerthan
the lower end of that range. For these numbers do not take
into account several signiﬁcant factors.
One is alternative policy options to eliminating inﬂa-
tion. If the beneﬁts of reducing transaction costs are de-
sired, most of them can be achieved in simpler, more di-
rect ways than manipulating the inﬂation rate. Some ob-
vious ways are to just allow more forms of money that are
used in transactions to earn market rates of interest. If that
were done, less effort would be necessary to decrease the
balances of forms that don’t. Speciﬁcally, all demand de-
posits that are now not allowed to earn market rates of in-
terest could be deregulated. At the same time, policyma-
kers could pay interest on reserves held by ﬁnancial insti-
tutions as backing for those and other deposits. This sort
of deregulation could be done with all forms of money ex-




action cost beneﬁt possible from a zero inﬂation policy
wouldn’t be much. Circulating currency is a very small
part of the total amount of money used in transactions: In
1989, it was only about a quarter of M1. For that small
amount,reducingtransaction costsbyeliminatinginﬂation
would likely result in a welfare beneﬁt toward the lower
end of the estimated range: 0.04 percent of GNP, or less.
Even that calculation is likely too big, though, because
it mistakenly assumes something about the way taxes
would be affected if inﬂation were eliminated.
Taxes are affected by a zero inﬂation policy because
inﬂation itself is a type of tax. Inﬂation occurs when the
government increases the amount of money in the econo-
my, so that more dollars are chasing the available goods
andservices. Thegovernmentincreases inﬂationessential-
ly by printing more money and spending it. Officially, the
government could issue more Treasury bills, increase its
debt; but actually, when the Fed buys the T-bills, the gov-
ernmentissimplyborrowingfromitself—effectivelyprint-
ing more money to spend. This extra money and spending
in the economy transfers resources from the public to the
government; it’s a way to raise government revenue, a
formoftaxation.Ifinﬂationwereeliminated,therefore,the
government would likely replace it with another revenue-
raising tax.
The estimated beneﬁt from transaction cost reductions
implicitlyassumesthatthereplacementtaxwouldnotitself
reduce welfare, and that’s highly unlikely. The only taxes
that don’t reduce welfare, by distorting the economic de-
cisions people would have made otherwise, are lump-sum,
or head, taxes. These are ﬁxed amounts paid by groups
of people selected for some characteristic irrelevant to
their economic behavior (something other than income or
wealth,forexample).Lump-sumtaxesaresimplynotused
in the United States or most other countries because they
are viewed as inequitable, or unrelated to individuals’ abil-
ity to pay. Therefore, the only tax available to replace in-
ﬂation is one that distorts economic behavior and so re-
duces welfare. The estimated beneﬁt from transaction cost
reductions thus must be reduced further by some unknown
amount.
5
Whatever remains of the studies’ estimated beneﬁt
could disappear—or even turn negative—when one last
factor is taken into account: the fact that most U.S. curren-
cy is not held by law-abiding U.S. residents.
This perhaps surprising fact affects the studies’ esti-
mates in two ways. One is directly. The estimates implic-
itly assume that more or less all U.S. currency is held by
adult U.S. residents; these are the people they assume
would beneﬁt from inﬂation’s elimination. According to
a Federal Reserve study, however, adult U.S. residents
instead hold only about 12–14 percent of it (Avery et al.
1987).
6 Thus, the estimates of a transaction cost beneﬁt
from a zero inﬂation policy must be reduced accordingly.
But these estimates must also be reduced because of an
indirect welfare effect, one that comes from inﬂation’s ef-
fect on those who do hold most of the U.S. currency. For
the Fed study also implies that over 80 percent of it is
held by people who are residents of other countries and
people who are engaged in illegal activities (in the under-
groundeconomy).ThesearepeopleforwhomU.S.policy-
makers may not want to eliminate the inﬂation tax.
Iftheinﬂationtaxwereeliminated,resourceswouldim-
plicitly be transferred from U.S. citizens, who don’t use
U.S. currencymuch, tocitizens of other countries,who do.
This clearly implies some welfare loss to U.S. citizens.
More will be lost, too, because of the drop in the in-
ﬂation tax on the activities of people in the underground
economy, who also use currency a lot. These activities
have harmful side effects on people in the legitimate econ-
omy (aboveground). Illegal activities generally in some
way reduce the happiness, or satisfaction, or economic
welfare of individuals who obey the laws. Prostitution and
drug-dealing, for example, may proﬁt the people involved,
but at the least, they lower the property values of others
in the neighborhood. (Economists call these harmful side
effects negative externalities.) Eliminating inﬂation may
also encourage cash transactions designed to evade taxes.
So policymakers likely would be concerned about these
activities but almost surely unable to tax them in any way
other than inﬂation. After all, by deﬁnition, illegal activi-
ties escape explicit forms of taxation. Thus, eliminating in-
ﬂation would reduce total economic welfare by eliminat-
ing a beneﬁcial tax.
7 Taking account of this missed effect
of zero inﬂation would likely reduce the remaining trans-
action cost beneﬁt quite a bit. The remaining beneﬁt was,
at most, only 0.04 percent of GNP. Much of a reduction
in a beneﬁt of that size would drop it below zero—or turn
it into a cost.
Reducing the Capital Income Tax
Another often-mentioned beneﬁt of eliminating inﬂation
is a reduction in the capital income tax. I think that, if oth-
er ways to reduce the capital income tax are considered,
estimates of this beneﬁt, like those for the transaction cost
beneﬁt, are much too high. In fact, the beneﬁt that zero in-
ﬂation could provide through the tax system drops to zero.
Eliminating inﬂation reduces the capital income tax be-
causeinﬂationeffectivelyincreasesthistax.Inﬂationraisesmarket prices, in particular, what businesses have to pay
to replace wornout capital stock, but the federal tax code
doesn’t take that into account. When calculating the tax
on their income, businesses are allowed to subtract the de-
preciation of their capital stock, but they must value it at
historical rather than current market prices. With inﬂation,
therefore, the capital income tax must be ﬁgured on a larg-
er amount than it would be otherwise, and the effective tax
rate is higher. Without inﬂation, there is no distinction be-
tween historical and current prices, so the effective tax rate
on capital income is lower.
Studieshaveestimatedquitelargewelfarebeneﬁtsfrom
this sort of tax reduction. A theoretical model suggests, for
a start, that a ﬁve percentage point change in inﬂation is
equivalent, roughly, to a ten percentage pointchange in the
effective tax rate on real corporate proﬁts (Kydland and
Prescott 1980). Studies of actual changes in U.S. inﬂation
and taxes generally agree with that rough estimate (Feld-
steinandSummers1979,FeldsteinandPoterba1980).The
theoretical model also estimates that such changes in inﬂa-
tion and the effective capital income tax rate would, in the
long run, increase the capital stock about 20 percent and
total production about 5 percent (Kydland and Prescott
1980).
That wouldn’t be the size of the welfare beneﬁt, of
course. To determine the effect on individual welfare, the
production increase must be translated into a welfare mea-
sure. Aquantitativestudyhasprovidedsomethingtogoon
(Lucas 1990). It says that adopting the optimal policy for
aneconomy(eliminatingthecapitalincometaxandreplac-
ing it with a wage tax)
8would, in the long run, increase the
capitalstockabout33percentandpersonalconsumptionof
goods and services between 4 percent and 7 percent. In the
long run, the study suggests, the optimal policy would pro-
duce an overall welfare beneﬁt of between 5.5 percent and
7 percent of consumption.
9 But the change to this policy
would also have some short-run costs; to increase the capi-
tal stock, consumption would have to be temporarily de-
creased and saving temporarily increased. Therefore, the
totalwelfarebeneﬁtfromthispolicywouldbesmaller.Ac-
cording to this study, for example, subtracting short-run
costs may shrink a long-run beneﬁt of 6.7 percent of con-
sumptionto0.4–0.7percent—asmaller,butstillsigniﬁcant
beneﬁt.
That, again, would be the result of an optimal policy
change. Using it and the other studies as a guide, though,
we can estimate the likely capital income tax beneﬁt of the
proposed zero inﬂation policy change. This change, again,
would mean reducing the inﬂation rate ﬁve percentage
points, which the studies say would reduce the capital in-
come tax rate about ten percentage points. If the effective
rate is assumed to start out at 36 percent, then based on the
studies,thiswelfarebeneﬁtshouldbeabout0.10–0.20per-
cent of consumption.
10 Since personal consumption is
about 60 percent of GNP, the overall beneﬁt from this
source can be estimated at about 0.06–0.12 percent of
GNP.
Still,noneofthisbeneﬁtshouldbeattributedtothezero
inﬂation policy: all of it could be achieved in other, more
direct ways.
The simplest way to get a welfare beneﬁt from a re-
duction in the capital income tax is, obviously, to just low-
er that tax. Indexing depreciation allowances to inﬂation
would lower the tax rate and produce the same welfare
beneﬁt without any potential costs that might come from
reducing inﬂation.
A slightly more complicated change might work better
than that. Some have argued that depreciation allowances
shouldn’t be indexed to inﬂation (Judd 1989). They say
that a zero tax rate on capital income is optimal, but only
on average. In an economy with uncertainty, the optimal
policy is to vary the capital income tax rate with govern-
ment spending.
11 That happens naturally when the tax is
not indexed to inﬂation (since inﬂation tends to vary with
government spending), but it wouldn’t happen with index-
ing. This objection doesn’t eliminate indexing as an op-
tion, however. It just suggests that depreciation allowances
might be better indexed to expected inﬂation (or some
long-run average rate of inﬂation) instead of to the actual
inﬂation rate. If this were done, then the actual tax rate
could still vary with actual inﬂation, as is thought to be
optimal.
A more difficult, but still simple way to get a welfare
beneﬁt from a reduction in the capital income tax would
be to index the whole federal tax code to inﬂation. This
massive change would likely be difficult to enact, but it
would surely wipe out all inﬂation’s effects on tax rates,
which seems to be desirable. And like the other, easier pol-
icy options, such a change would produce at least the
same tax beneﬁts as would the proposed zero inﬂation pol-
icy, without any of its costs.
These options obviously leave no capital income tax
beneﬁts left to attribute to zero inﬂation.
Reducing Uncertainty
Perhaps the most often-mentioned beneﬁt of eliminating
inﬂation is through a reduction in uncertainty about why
prices of goods and services are changing—is it due to a
real change in the economy (which changes the prices of
some goods relative to those of others, or relative prices)
or merelyto achange in themoney supply(which changes
all prices, the general price level, inﬂation)? (See, for
example, Friedman 1977 and U.S. Congress 1990.) Stud-
ies have not yet managed to quantify this uncertainty ben-
eﬁt, but that’s appropriate: according to the available evi-
dence, it may not be much of a beneﬁt.
The beneﬁt is thought to come from letting the price
system operate properly. In a market economy, changes in
prices of particular goods and services are supposed to sig-
nal to market participants when the demand for or supply
of those goods and services has changed. If that can hap-
pen, then the economy’s available resources will ﬂow
where society wants them, to produce the goods and ser-
vices wanted in the amounts wanted. Inﬂation disrupts this
system, making the price signals hard to read. Especially
when inﬂation is high and variable, people see changes in
prices for particular goods and services, but they don’t
know what’s causing them—a general inﬂation due to
money changes or real changes in what consumers want
or what producers can supply. As a result, economic de-
cision-making is harder, and the decisions made are not
likely to be those that would have been made otherwise.
Sometimes, output will change in response to changes in
the money supply even though real demand and supply
conditions have not changed. With inﬂation high and vari-
able, that is, the economy’s available resources are likely
tobemisallocated.Eliminatinginﬂationisthoughttoelim-inate the misperceptions and let only changes in real de-
mand and supply conditions direct the allocation of re-
sources, as people want.
Despite the popularity of this argument, economic
studies do not strongly support it as a source of any poten-
tial beneﬁt from a zero inﬂation policy.
True,someeconomictheorydoessupportthisidea.One
theoretical study (Lucas 1972) has shown that changes in
the money supply can change economic decisions. In a
model with some relevant elements—changes in money
(and thus inﬂation), real changes (in demand and supply
forces),uncertainty,andimperfectinformation—thisstudy
ﬁnds a positive correlation between inﬂation and output.
This suggests that movements in output and in relative
prices of goods and services can be caused by money ex-
pansionandnotjustbyrealdemandandsupplyforces.The
changes in money involved here, though, must be unex-
pected. In this model, expected money changes do not
make relative prices more variable or change output.
Two empirical studies also ﬁnd some relationship be-
tween changes in inﬂation and relative prices. One (Vining
and Elwertowski1976)ﬁndsasimplepositiverelationship
between these changes. The other study (Parks 1978) ﬁnds
just what theory predicts: a strong positive relationship be-
tweenunexpectedchangesintheinﬂationrateandchanges
in relative prices, but not between changes in the general
inﬂation rate (the trend rate) and in relative prices.
However, other studies looking for evidence for this
theory don’t ﬁnd it. One (Fischer 1981b) looks at data for
the U.S. economy during 1956–80. It ﬁnds that what was
primarilyresponsible fortherelationshipbetween inﬂation
and relative prices in this period was not money changes
but real supply shocks, large surprise movements in food
and energy prices in the 1970s. Another study (Hercowitz
1982) agrees. It looks at U.S. data for a slightly different
period, 1948–76. Taking the effects of the real supply
shocks into account, it concludes that changes in money
(inﬂation)—expectedorunexpected—didnotsigniﬁcantly
affect changes in relative prices.
Studies that could provide some indirect evidence for
this theory don’t—or, at best, they ﬁnd only weak evi-
dence. Two (Barro 1977, 1978) support the theory: they
ﬁnd a strong relationship between unexpected changes in
money and changes in output and unemployment. One
study (Barro and Hercowitz 1980) doesn’t ﬁnd any such
relationship, however. And another (Boschen and Gross-
man 1982) ﬁnds just the opposite of what the theory pre-
dicts:norelationshipbetweenunexpectedchangesinmon-
ey and changes in output, but a small relationship between
actual changes.
The theory is questionable in several other ways, as
well. Little or no evidence exists for the theory’s predic-
tion that unexpected movements in the price level are sig-
niﬁcantlyrelatedtochangesinoutputoremployment(Sar-
gent 1976, Fair 1979). Also, very hard to believe is the
theory’s suggestion that imperfect information is an im-
portant link in the chain between money and output: The
U.S. public arebarraged dailywith data onthe moneysup-
ply and other economic indicators. And ﬁnally, a closer
look at the data suggests a different interpretation for the
relationshipbetweenmoneyandoutput.TheFed’sbroader
measures of the money supply seem to be more closely
correlated with output than are its narrower measures. The
broadermeasuresincludelargecomponents(likeliabilities
of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions) that are affected
bychangesingeneraleconomicactivity.Thisstronglysug-
gests that anypositive correlation between money andout-
put noted by empirical studies is due to money responding
to output rather than vice versa.
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Even if the theory were right, though, reducing the av-
erage rate of inﬂation to zero may not have any effect on
welfare. People who favor the zero inﬂation policy sug-
gest that lowering inﬂation on average would necessarily
make inﬂation less variable. Simple U.S. data support that
idea. According to the data for the 1960s and the 1970s,
the higher inﬂation is on average, the more it varies. But
these data may be misleading. A study of them (Taylor
1981) ﬁnds that the observed relationship between level
and variability is due merely to monetary policy responses
to supply shocks that had lifted the inﬂation rate. Govern-
ment attempts to decrease ﬂuctuations in output increased
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation. Thus, intentionally reducing the
average money growth rate (to reduce inﬂation’s level)
wouldn’t automatically reduce inﬂation’s variability. All
of this may be only marginally relevant for economic wel-
fare, anyway. What matters for welfare is not the variabili-
ty of inﬂation, but the variability of personal consumption
of goods and services, and that is already pretty low. Two
studies (Fischer 1981b, Lucas 1985) say that, per person,
consumption in the United States doesn’t vary much.
Thus, reducing the variability of consumption won’t im-
prove welfare much.
...S m a l lo rNegative
This analysis of the zero inﬂation policy has more or less
eliminated the potential beneﬁts from reducing uncertainty
and reducing the capital income tax. All that’s left as a po-
tential beneﬁt of zero inﬂation is that from reducing trans-
action costs. As we have seen, that beneﬁt—and so total
beneﬁts from this policy—would likely be very small:
much less than 0.04 percent of GNP, the low end of the
transaction cost estimate, and possibly less than zero.
The Costs of Zero Inﬂation?. . .
With economic welfare beneﬁts so small, the zero inﬂa-
tionpolicycouldn’treasonablybeconsideredadvisableun-
less its costs were, at most, insigniﬁcant. That’s not likely.
Sticky Money Contracts
Economists have identiﬁed one way that policies intended
to reduce inﬂation would also reduce output and increase
unemployment: through rigidity in contracts speciﬁed in
money amounts (money contracts). These effects are usu-
ally presumed to also reduce society’s welfare, or have a
cost.
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The general idea is that decisions to enter into money
contracts are made with an expectation of continued inﬂa-
tion, and these decisions likely would not have been made
as they were without that expectation. Reducing inﬂation
thuswilllikelyreduceeconomicwelfare,atleasttemporar-
ily—as long as people are stuck with their binding agree-
ments. When inﬂation drops, money’s purchasing power,
or real value, rises, but the money amounts in the con-
tracts do not change to fully compensate people for the
price level change. They would if these amounts were ful-
ly indexed to price level changes. Otherwise, though, the
unexpected changes in real values will necessarily changepeople’s behavior and so economic welfare until the con-
tracts run out and new ones can be negotiated.
These general costs apply to any money contracts that
are not fully indexed to inﬂation, but economists have ex-
tensively studied only one type: the labor contract. The
welfare costs that an inﬂation-reducing policy would pro-
duce through labor contracts parallel the general descrip-
tion above. What sticks with labor contracts are money
wages. These wages are agreed on with an expectation
about inﬂation on both sides of the contract: the employ-
ers and the workers. If inﬂation were to drop unexpected-
ly, money wages wouldn’t change, but real wages would
increase. That would mean employers would effectively
be paying more than they expected to for labor (as well as
anything else under contract). They would respond by cut-
ting back production and laying off workers or simply not
hiring some they would have otherwise. This disruption in
economic activity would affect overall economic welfare,
atleasttemporarily.Theeconomy’stotalproductionwould
decrease, unemployment would increase, and individuals’
consumption—and,presumably,theirsatisfaction—would
decrease. These effects wouldcontinue until the labor con-
tracts expired and new money wages could be negotiated,
taking the new expected inﬂation rate into account.
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The Importance of Being Credible
Estimating the size of this cost of a zero inﬂation policy
is difficult because economists disagree on how best to an-
alyze it. They do seem to agree, though, that the cost will
be much smaller if the policy is taken seriously by the
public.
The starting point for these analyses is the inverse rela-
tionship between changes in money wages (inﬂation) and
the unemployment rate. This relationship was noted in
1958 by economist A. W. Phillips and was later named
the Phillips curve. Economists quickly interpreted this re-
lationship as a trade-off that policymakers could exploit:
for each percentage point they managed to decrease the
inﬂation rate, they had to accept an increase in unemploy-
ment, which means a decrease in output. The size of the
output decrease became known as the sacriﬁce ratio.
The likely size of this ratio—and thus the estimated
welfare cost of any inﬂation policy—seems to vary with
the views economists have about the way the public see
inﬂation policy in general.
Oneview—thatofKeynesianeconomists—seemstobe
that inﬂation policy is never credible. This is an interpreta-
tionbasedonthewayKeynesianstreatexpectations.When
theseeconomistsanalyze inﬂationpolicy,they seemtoim-
plicitly assume that the inﬂation rate people expect when
they make wage contracts is unrelated to the actual inﬂa-
tion rate, or, especially, to monetary policy. In Keynesian
models, expectations are independent of these things. This
assumption could be seen as an assumption that people
are stupid or irrational—they ignore obviously relevant
things when forming expectations about inﬂation—but
this is hard to believe. If that were true, for example, why
would so much media attention be focused on what the
Fed is doing now and what it’s likely to do next? A more
reasonable way to interpret the Keynesian assumption is
that people simply don’t believe what the government
says about its current or future inﬂation policy, so they
form expectations independent of that.
Economistswiththisviewestimatethecostofeliminat-
inginﬂationasquitelarge.Twostudies(Okun1978,Fisch-
er 1984) put the sacriﬁce ratio, on average, at 10 percent of
a year’s GNP. A more recent study (Blinder 1989) puts it
somewhat lower, at 6 percent of a year’s GNP. An aver-
age of the two most recent studies’ estimates thus puts the
ratio at 8 percent of a year’s GNP. With a sacriﬁce ratio
that large, the lost output from the proposed ﬁve-year zero
inﬂation policy is huge: 40 percent of a year’s GNP, or
about 2 trillion current dollars.
Not all economists think inﬂation policy always is in-
credible, however. Some—rational expectations econo-
mists—taketheviewthatthistypeof policycouldbecred-
ible or not and which it is will determine the policy’s cost.
When these economists analyze inﬂation policy, they ex-
plicitly assume that policy credibility is reﬂected in peo-
ple’s expectations for inﬂation; that is, expectations take
into account people’s evaluations of inﬂation experience
and the course of monetary policy, and those evaluations
are correct.
Under this view, the cost of reducing inﬂation could be
the same as that which the Keynesians expect. If the pub-
licdonotbelievethegovernment’spolicyannouncements,
then the sacriﬁce ratio for reductions in inﬂation will be
large.
This view allows for the possibility of a much smaller
cost, though. If the public are convinced that the govern-
ment is really shifting to an announced new lower-inﬂa-
tion policy and will stick to it, then the sacriﬁce ratio could
be close to zero. People who believe the government will
quickly reduce their expectations of inﬂation and, as old
labor contracts expire, lower their wage demands. As a re-
sult, output will not be affected much by the inﬂation re-
duction. An abrupt, surprise change in policy could cost
some output. But a gradual, credible reduction in inﬂation
could cost very little. At the start of such a policy, some
output could be lost due to confusion about whether the
observed slow money growth rates are planned or acci-
dental. Still, those losses would soon stop, and the total
output lost would be much smaller than the Keynesian es-
timates.
The economic literature includes many studies support-
ing the rational expectations view of this cost. Several are
worthy of special note. Two related studies (Taylor 1980,
1983) show theoretically that if policy is credible, inﬂation
can be lowered quickly with no cost in output. The mod-
el in these studies has rational expectations and staggered
(overlapping) wage contracts, and as contracts expire and
new ones are negotiated, their wage increases are reduced.
In a version of the model with three-year contracts, for ex-
ample, inﬂation can be lowered seven percentage points in
four years with no loss in output.
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A striking historical study (Sargent 1982) shows more
or less the same thing. This study examines the economic
experience in four European countries (Austria, Germany,
Hungary, and Poland) in the period between the two world
wars. During this time, the governments in these countries
ran enormous budget deﬁcits, which led to enormous in-
ﬂations, known as hyperinﬂations. In each country, the
government adopted a highly credible inﬂation-reduction
policy, consisting of binding international agreements as
well as ﬁscal and monetary reforms. Then, in each coun-try, the price level that had been rising very rapidly stabi-
lized abruptly with relatively little cost in output.
...P r obably Signiﬁcant
Despite the possibilities provided by the rational expecta-
tions view, the total cost of the zero inﬂation policy is not
likely to be insigniﬁcant. As we have seen, for the cost to
beverysmall,thepolicyhastobecredible.Policycredibil-
ity requires coordination between monetary and ﬁscal au-
thorities—something that hasn’t been seen lately in the
United States.
The need for this coordination is well established in the
literature. We saw it, for example, in the interwar hyperin-
ﬂation study (Sargent 1982). It is demonstrated theoreti-
cally in another prominent study (Sargent and Wallace
1981). This study shows that the Fed simply can’t keep to
atight money(low or zeromoney growth)policy ifthe ﬁs-
calauthoritiescontinuetorunlargebudgetdeﬁcits.Budget
policy determines how much money the government is
spending and where it’s getting money to spend, through
taxing or borrowing. If the ﬁscal authorities insist on deﬁ-
cit spending despite an attempted zero inﬂation policy, the
Fed’s policy will be in trouble. As we have seen, more
government debt—if bought by the Fed—means more
money in the economy and more inﬂation. But if both the
public and the Fed were to refuse to buy the extra govern-
ment debt, the government would be insolvent. The Fed
will thus have little choice but to give in. The public,
therefore, are not likely to take the Fed’s commitment to
a zero inﬂation policy seriously if Congress and the ad-
ministration don’t at the same time get the federal budget
under control.
How likely is that? Anyone paying even occasional at-
tentiontothemediaknowsthatthefederalgovernmenthas
shown few signs of getting its budget under control. This
has likely given the public quite large, persistent doubts
abouttheFed’s abilitytosticktoa zeroinﬂationpolicy(re-
gardless of its good intentions). Such large doubts mean
that the costs of the proposed zero inﬂation policy could
also be large.
Conclusion
This cost/beneﬁt analysis has essentially deﬂated the case
for the proposed policy of achieving zero inﬂation in ﬁve
years: on balance, the policy does not appear to be advis-
able.Zeroinﬂationwouldhavebothcostsandbeneﬁts,but
the costs likely would not be small, and the beneﬁts likely
would be; they might even be negative. That judgment
comes from a consideration of other, more direct policies
than the one proposed. Speciﬁcally, instead of trying to
manipulate the inﬂation rate, U.S. policymakers should se-
riously consider allowing all demand deposits to earn mar-
ket interest rates, paying interest on reserves held by ﬁ-
nancial institutions as backing for these and other deposits,
lowering the federal tax rate on capital income, and index-
ing the federal tax code to inﬂation. These changes could
achieve most of the desired beneﬁts of zero inﬂation with-
out the possibly signiﬁcant costs.
*This is a a revised and expanded version of the author’s unpublished paper, “The
Costs of Reaching Zero Inﬂation,” co-authored with David K. Backus.
1The bill was H.J. Res. 409, introduced by Representative Stephen L. Neal of
North Carolina (101st Cong., 1st sess., September 25, 1989). See also U.S. Congress
1990.
2In the United States today, most of the demand deposits that earn no interest are
heldbylargebusinesses.Thesebusinessesarenotallowedtoholdinterest-bearingcheck-
ing accounts.
3One more-recent study (Imrohoroglu 1989) argues that the estimates of the older
studies (Fischer 1981a and Lucas 1981) may be too low. This study uses a model in
whichmoneysmoothsconsumptionwhenincomeﬂuctuatesrandomlyandthoseﬂuctu-
ations cannot be insured against. The model estimates the welfare beneﬁt of a ten per-
centage point inﬂation reduction as about 1 percent of GNP.
However, in this model, money is the only asset available to smooth consumption.
If the model included other assets, its estimate of the welfare beneﬁt would be much
smaller. In the United States, after all, currency is only about 4.5 percent of total liquid
assets (according to December 1987 data).
4Policymakers could go even further and remove the prohibition against ﬁnancial
institutions issuing small-denomination bearer notes. This might effectively take the
government out of the business of providing currency. (See Wallace 1983 for a theory
of the demand for ﬁat money based on such legal restrictions.) The merits, or lack
thereof, of such an extreme policy do not necessarily have any bearing on the merits of
the other policy options. Another extreme policy—paying interest on bank reserves
whileincreasingreserve requirementsto 100percent—would effectivelyturnbanks in-
to money warehouses (Friedman 1960). However, such a proposal may be ignoring an
essential liquidity-creating role of banks (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).
5In the United Stales, the amount of revenue raised by the inﬂation tax is actually
quite small: currently, it is about 0.3 percent of GNP. Therefore, if the inﬂation rate
were brought down to zero, replacing the lost revenue by other taxes should be fairly
easy. One study (Fischer 1981a) suggests that, with the inﬂation rate at 9 percent, there
is a clear welfare beneﬁt to reducing that rate to zero and replacing the lost inﬂation
tax revenue by taxing wage income.
6This proportion has apparently remained fairly stable. It matches, roughly, the
proportions found by studies in 1944 and 1974.
7In fact, the correct inﬂation tax rate to be levied on the underground economy
may well be higher than that implied by the current inﬂation rate of around 5 percent.
Some quick calculations will suggest this. Suppose, for simplicity, that the amount
of currency held by the underground economy is a constant proportion k of GUP (by
which I mean gross underground product). If GUP is some fraction x times GNP and
the currency held inthe underground economy is some fraction ytimes the total curren-
cy held, then k =(y/x) (total currency/GNP) = 0.04(y/x), according to 1989 data. If the
money growth rate is 7 percent (which implies an inﬂation rate of 5 percent after 2 per-
cent is subtracted for real GNP growth), then the effective tax rate on GUP is given by
k(0.07/1.07) = (0.04) × (0.07)y/(1.07x) = 0.0026(y/x). Two studies provide some esti-
mates of x (the size of GUP relative to GNP) and y (the proportion of all outstanding
currency that is held underground). They say x is probably not less than 10 percent
(Gutmann 1977, Feige 1979) and yis about 6 percent (Avery et al. 1987). The effective
income tax rate on the underground economy is, then, 0.156 percent. That is,a5p e r -
cent inﬂation rate is equivalent to a 0.156 percent income tax rate on activities in the
underground economy. Even if x were as low as 2 percent and y as high as 20 percent,
the effective income tax rate on the underground economy works out to only 2.6 per-
cent.
That’s obviously far below the income tax rate faced by those aboveground. This
suggests that 5 percent inﬂation rate is likely to imply too low, rather than too high, a
tax rate.
Eliminating inﬂation may therefore turn a transaction cost welfare gain into a loss.
In this context, the idea of deregulating interest rates on all demand deposits and paying
interest on reserves is even more attractive. For doing these things would lower the cost
of the inﬂation tax on the aboveground economy without lowering it on the under-
ground economy.
8For a theoretical argument that the optimal long-run tax rate on capital income
is zero, see Chamley 1985, 1986. The optimal long-run tax rate is the appropriate tax
rate to be levied in the very distant future.
9These numbers are based on a particular, but reasonable speciﬁcation of the pa-
rameters for the economy.
10According to Lucas’ (1990) calculation for the United States, total taxes attribut-
able to capital income were about 36 percent of total capital income in 1985.
11The models of Chamley (1985, 1986) and Lucas (1990) have no uncertainty.
12See Plosser1989, Abstract,for theview that“the empiricalevidence foramone-
tary theory of the [business] cycle is weak. Not only do variations in nominal money
explainverylittleofsubsequentmovementsinrealactivity,butwhatexplanatorypower
exists arises from variations in endogenous components of money.” See also Barro
1989 for a short, useful summary of the empirical deﬁciencies of the theory as well as
many pertinent references.
13This presumption is by no means well established.
14The inﬂation-reducing effects on another type of money contract have only re-
cently begun to be studied by economists: those on the loan contract. No quantitative
estimates of these effects are available, but their analysis is quite similar to that for
wage contracts.
In general, the idea here is that unexpectedly reducing inﬂation could lead to costly
defaultsandbankruptciesofdebtorswhohavelong-term,nominallydenominated,unin-
dexed loans outstanding. Like wage contracts, loan contracts may have been entered
intowiththeexpectationthatthecurrentmonetaryexpansionwouldcontinue.Anunex-
pected change in monetary policy to lower the inﬂation rate would increase the real
value of the existing debt burden. Therefore, the net worth of potential borrowers and
entrepreneurs could be adversely affected. This could decrease or eliminate new loans
to them and thereby reduce proﬁtable investments that might otherwise have been
made. (See Fisher 1933 and Bernanke and Gertler 1989.)
As withwage contracts,though, the loancontract effectswould only betemporary.
New loan contracts would be tailored to reﬂect the new, lower inﬂation rate.15However, according to this model, a faster decrease in the inﬂation rate is only
possible at some cost in terms of output.
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